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Abstract
Synthesizing concepts and ﬁndings from a number of recent models of human consciousness,
a uniﬁed model of the key properties characterizing human consciousness is outlined. Six
key properties are emphasized: Dynamical representation of the focus of consciousness,
Focusing of energetic resources and focusing of informational resources on a subset
of system knowledge, Global Workspace dynamics as outlined by Bernard Baars in his
cognitive theory of consciousness, Integrated Information as emphasized by Tononi, and
correlation of attentional focus with self-modeling. It is proposed that the extent, and
relative importance, of these properties may vary in diﬀerent states of consciousness; and that
any AI system displaying closely human-like intelligence will need to manifest these properties
in its consciousness as well. The “hard problem” of consciousness is sidestepped throughout,
via focusing on structures and dynamics posited to serve as neural or cognitive correlates of
subjective conscious experience.
Keywords: Consciousness, Information Integration, Global Workspace, Nonlinear Dynamics
1 Introduction
These days, unlike a few decades ago, consciousness is a signiﬁcant topic of research in psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, philosophy and other ﬁelds. However, there remains no scientiﬁc consensus
on how to deﬁne or conceptualize consciousness, let alone on how to quantitatively measure it,
or formally model its structure or dynamics. Among other open questions, there is no broadly
accepted way to measure the degree of consciousness displayed or experienced by a system (be
it a human or other animal brain, or an robot or other AI) during a certain interval of time.
I will not aim, here, to address the foundational question of “what consciousness funda-
mentally is.” Instead, the question I will focus on is: What are the important properties
speciﬁcally characterizing human, or human-like, consciousness?. 1
1Just as physics has told us many interesting and useful things about the movement of objects without
resolving all the core philosophical issues regarding the nature of space and time, I believe we can come to many
valuable conclusions about consciousness without ﬁrst needing to resolve all related philosophical perplexities.
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In the longer paper [13] 2 , the key conclusions of which this brief conference paper sum-
marizes, a number of contemporary analyses of human consciousness are analyzed from this
multifactorial perspective: Baars’ Global Workspace Theory [3, 4] and the LIDA software sys-
tem that partially embodies it [23]; Tononi’s Integrated Information theory [26]; Goerner and
Combs’ analysis of consciousness in terms of nonlinear dynamics and energy minimization [10];
Tart’s theory of states of consciousness [25]; and the analysis of consciousness in terms of
reﬂective self-modeling [19, 20, 12]. It is argued that these theories, diverse on the surface,
are actually elucidating diﬀerent aspects of the same complex underlying human consciousness
process. This brief conference paper summarizes the main conclusions of the analysis given
there.
What is proposed here is to explore the possibility of measuring the degree of consciousness
displayed by a human or human-like system, using multiple factors derived from these multiple
theoretical perspectives Six key factors relevant to measuring human-like consciousness are
summarized as: 1) Dynamical representation of the focus of consciousness; 2) Focusing of
energetic resources on a subset of system knowledge; 3) Focusing of informational resources
on a subset of system knowledge; 4) Global Workspace dynamics; 5) Integrated Information,
perhaps as quantiﬁed by Tononi; and, 6) Correlation of attentional focus with self-modeling.
The optimal ways to quantify all these phenomena are not yet clear. What is argued here is
that, if one wishes to quantify the degree of consciousness of real-world systems, this is the right
way to proceed – i.e., by identifying and then quantifying multiple aspects of the multifarious,
multifactorial dynamical process that is human-like consciousness.
1.1 Hard and Possibly Less Hard Problems Regarding Consciousness
David Chalmers [6] famously distinguished the “hard problem of consciousness” from other
issues regarding consciousness – where what he meant by the “hard problem” was, in essence,
the problem of connecting subjective experience (the “raw feel” of consciousness, sometimes
referred to using the term “qualia”) with empirically observable factors. According to my
own understanding, in the current ontology of intellectual disciplines, this “hard problem” is
a philosophical rather than scientiﬁc problem. My reasoning is that science , as currently
understood, is focused on prediction and explanation of measurements that are observable by
an arbitrary observer within a community; whereas subjective experience, by its nature, is not
observable by an arbitrary observer with a community.
The topic addressed in this paper is the cognitive and neural correlates of human and human-
like consciousness [18]. I believe this topic can be explored quite thoroughly without making
any commitments regarding the “hard problem.” However, it would be dishonest of me not to
clarify that I do have a personal and intellectual position on the “hard problem.” In particular,
I tend to agree with Chalmers that that some sort of panpsychism is probably the right answer
– i.e. I tend to view consciousness as a property that everything in existence possess to some
degree and in some form. Analytic philosopher Galen Strawson [24] has argued strenuously
and rigorously that any other perspective is logically ill-founded; there is no consistent, sensible
way to view consciousness and the physical world as separate but interacting entities. But if
one accepts this, there remain diﬃcult questions regarding why particular physical entities are
associated with particular sorts of conscious experience. The philosophical and scientiﬁc aspects
of panpsychism have been explored in detail by many others [24, 7, 2] and I will not repeat
those discussions here. The central ideas in this paper are not predicated on the panpsychist
perspective, so I mention my orientation toward panpsychism here mainly to point out that
2See http://goertzel.org/goertzel_consciousness_review.pdf
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there is at least one simple, conceptually coherent answer to the question of the basic nature
of consciousness, which appears to be fully consistent with the concepts discussed.
2 Toward a Uniﬁed Model of Human and Human-Like
Consciousness
Based on the literature and concepts mentioned above and reviewed in detail in [13], I propose
an integrative understanding of the critical factors characterizing the consciousness of human
beings, and likely to characterize the consciousness of AI systems with roughly human-like
cognitive architectures . I suggest that, when a human-like system has the experience of being
conscious of some entity X, then the system should manifest:
1. Dynamical representation: the entity X should correspond to a distributed, dynamic
pattern of activity spanning a portion of the system (a “probabilistically invariant sub-
space of the system’s state space”). Note that X may also correspond to a localized
representation, e.g. a concept neuron in the human brain [21]
2. Focusing of energetic resources: the entity X should be the subject of a high degree
of energetic attentional focusing
3. Focusing of informational resources: X should also be the subject of a high degree
of informational attentional focusing
4. Global Workspace dynamics: X should be the subject of GWT style broadcasting
throughout the various portions of the system’s active knowledge store, including those
portions with medium or low degrees of current activity. The GW “functional hub” doing
the broadcasting is the focus of energetic and informational energy
5. Integrated Information: the information observable in the system, and associated with
X, should display a high level of information integration
6. Correlation of attentional focus with self-modeling: X should be associated with
the system’s “self-model”, via associations that may have a high or medium level of
conscious access, but not generally a low level
These I will call six key factors of human-like consciousness. I do not claim that they are
the only important aspects; but I do posit that they are among the most important aspects.
The ﬁrst ﬁve factors, I suggest, are relevant regardless of the state of consciousness – but
may have diﬀerent levels of importance in diﬀerent states of consciousness. On the other
hand, the sixth factor may play a minimal role in some states of consciousness, e.g. “non-
symbolic” states as experienced by meditators, advanced spiritual practitioners and others [17].
Relative to the ordinary waking state of consciousness, psychedelic states [25] and ﬂow states
[8],would (qualitatively speaking) seem to involve less of a role for the self-model, as well as less
concentrated attentional focusing.
2.1 Measuring Human-Like Consciousness Multifactorially
How then can one measure the degree of consciousness possessed by a system at a certain point
in time, or the degree of conscious access that a system is giving to a certain entity during
a certain interval of time? One reasonably tractable way to phrase this question, I suggest,
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is: How can one measure the degree of human-like conscious access that a system
gives to a certain entity during a certain interval of time?
To formalize the degree to which a system S gives human-like conscious access to an entity
X, as a ﬁrst approximation one could quantify the six factors listed above: energetic attentional
focusing, informational attentional focusing, GW broadcasting, information integration, and
association with self. One would then quantify conscious access as a weighted combination of
these factors, with the weighting being state of consciousness dependent.The formulation of
precise mathematical measures of each of these six factors would not be extremely diﬃcult, but
would require detailed analysis and would increase the length of this paper by a small integer
multiple. So these particularities will be left for sequel papers.
Next, given a deﬁnition of human-like conscious access, one can conceive
• the degree of human-like consciousness of a system as the sum over all entities X in the
system, of the degree to which the system gives X conscious access
• the ratio of human-like consciousness of a system as the average over all entities X in the
system, of the degree to which the system gives X conscious access
This characterization of human-like consciousness is admittedly messy, and in more than one
way. These six factors are all important, but it’s quite possible that a handful of further factors
could usefully be added to the list. Furthermore, each of these factors could be quantiﬁed
in multiple ways – as in the example of Tononi’s Information Integration measure, which is
only one among a large number of sensible-looking mathematical formulas for capturing the
conceptual notion of information integration.
This messiness, however, strikes me as inevitable – i.e. it is simply part of the territory,
which any reasonable map must reﬂect. Consciousness-in-general may be elementally simple in
some sense, but human consciousness is a speciﬁc cognitive construct that evolved to serve the
needs of speciﬁc sorts of organisms. AI systems may in principle display quite diﬀerent varieties
of consciousness; but if an AI system is going to display closely human-like intelligence, it will
almost surely need to manifest closely human-like consciousness as well. The processing and
memory dynamics that produce human-like consciousness are integral to the production of
human-like intelligence.
2.2 Measuring Consciousness in Brains, AI Systems and the Global
Brain
It is an appealing idea to use neurophysiological measurements to gauge the degree of con-
sciousness of a human brain, as it passes through various states and experiences. Given an
appropriate measure, the degree of consciousness of diﬀerent parts of the human brain could
also be gauged, providing a new perspective on the investigation of the neural correlates of
conscious experience.
Research has been done regarding the computation of certain (mathematically crude but
perhaps pragmatically valuable) estimates of the Integrated Information of the brain [5]. In
a similar vein, one could measure the informational attention focusing of the brain during a
certain period of time. Energetic attention focusing should be more straightforward to measure,
as standard tools such as fMRI already give a view into the brain’s energy expenditure.
Measurement of the degree to which the brain’s focus of attention is represented as a dy-
namical pattern, or the prevalence of GW dynamics in the brain, on the other hand, would seem
to require neuroimaging with simultaneous spatial and temporal resolution going beyond what
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current technology provides. One would need to be able to measure the broadcasting happening
within a single “conscious moment” between diﬀerent regions of the brain – say, on the time
scale of milliseconds, and the spatial scale of a cortical column. Such neuroimaging tools are
likely coming in the future and will have many exciting applications beyond the measurement
of consciousness. Perhaps analysis of the data provided by such tools will enable modeling of
the way the human brain builds its self-model, which will allow measurement of the association
between entities in the GW and the self-model as well.
As compared to measuring consciousness in the human brain, the measurement of human-
like consciousness in AI systems is a relatively straightforward matter. Issues of instrumentation
are reasonably rapidly resolvable, so one is left only with the problem of formalizing the relevant
aspects of consciousness in a computationally tractable way. This problem is far from trivial,
since mining patterns from the dynamics of a rapidly changing large-scale software system
is highly resource intensive. For instance, accurately computing the integrated information
according to Tononi’s deﬁnition seems likely to be an NP-hard problem [1].
Qualitatively, however, one can study existing AGI architectures and assess how they seem
likely to measure up according to the factors discussed above. In [13] the LIDA [23] and
OpenCog [14, 15] systems are reviewed in this light, the conclusion being that both are de-
signed in a way that is in principle amenable to displaying the six key aspects of human-like
consciousness highlighted here. The same would certainly be true of a number of other cogni-
tive architectures aimed at human-like AGI (see e.g. the review [9, 22]). The extent to which
human-like consciousness is actually manifested by running instances of these systems, is de-
pendent on the degree to which these instances actually implement the cognitive architectures
in question, and the extent to which these architectures operate as the underlying theories
predict.
One may also apply these ideas to the notion of an emergent “Global Brain” – an in-
telligence arising from collective dynamics in the global network of humans, computers and
communication devices [11, 16]. Many observers have argued that the Internet and related
networks already display some form of intelligence; and some have speculated that as related
technologies progress, the global communication/computing/social network will achieve more
and more of the aspects of an autonomous, individual mind. This line of thinking naturally
gives rise to the question of whether, or in what sense, a Global Brain could be conscious.
More particularly, from the perspective pursued here, one well-posed question is whether, and
to what degree, a Global Brain (GB) – today’s or a future descendant – might have human-like
consciousness. Quantifying the six factors of consciousness mentioned above in an Internet
context, would give a way of measuring the degree of human-like consciousness of the global
brain, and tracking the various features of this consciousness as it emerges.
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